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Abstract 
 
The links between climate change, economic growth and economic development have gained increasing 
attention over recent years in both the academic and policy literature. However, most of the existing literature 
has tended to focus on direct, short run effects of climate change on the economy, for example due to 
extreme weather events and changes in agricultural growing conditions. In this paper we review potential 
effects of climate change on the prospects for long-run economic development. These effects might operate 
directly, via the role of geography (including climate) as a fundamental determinant of relative prosperity, or 
indirectly by modifying the environmental context in which political and economic institutions evolve. We 
consider potential mechanisms from climate change to long-run economic development that have been 
relatively neglected to date, including, for instance, effects on the distribution of income and political power. 
We conclude with some suggestions for areas of future research.  
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Abstract: 
The links between climate change, economic growth and economic development have gained increasing 
attention over recent years in both the academic and policy literature. However, most of the existing literature 
has tended to focus on direct, short run effects of climate change on the economy, for example due to 
extreme weather events and changes in agricultural growing conditions. In this paper we review potential 
effects of climate change on the prospects for long-run economic development. These effects might operate 
directly, via the role of geography (including climate) as a fundamental determinant of relative prosperity, or 
indirectly by modifying the environmental context in which political and economic institutions evolve. We 
consider potential mechanisms from climate change to long-run economic development that have been 
relatively neglected to date, including, for instance, effects on the distribution of income and political power. 
We conclude with some suggestions for areas of future research.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
The links between climate change and economic development have gained increasing 
attention over recent years in both the academic and policy literature. Understanding the 
effects of climate change on economic development is fundamental not only for the design 
of optimal mitigation and adaptation strategies but also in the design of broader strategies 
for long-term economic development.  
 
The latest report from Working Group II of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC 2014), reflecting the state of the academic literature on climate impacts, 
focuses on the direct threats posed by climate change for, amongst other things, 
ecosystems, human health, agricultural productivity, and potential knock-on effects for 
issues such as food security, rural livelihoods and migration (e.g. Oppenheimer et al. 2014). 
We take this literature on climate impacts as a point of departure. Our intention in this 
paper is to step back from the immediate task of demonstrating economic impacts of 
climate change, identifying causal links and estimating the magnitude of potential effects – 
areas where the climate economics literature is perhaps currently most active – and instead, 
to consider potentially important directions for new research.  In particular, we try to 
understand how the kind of impacts that have been identified in the literature – some of 
which are already occurring today - might affect the trajectory of economic development 
over many decades to come. 
 
There has been extensive theoretical and empirical research on the proximate drivers of 
long-run economic growth. Factor accumulation (of physical and human capital) and 
technological progress have been identified as the main elements that account for growth 
differences across countries over time.1 Trying to explain differences between countries in 
their rates of factor accumulation and technological progress has led to a focus in the 
literature towards understanding the fundamental determinants of economic development.2 
Among these, geography and institutions have probably attracted the most attention.3 In 
this context, a key to understanding the long-run economic effects of climate change is to 
understand how climate change alters these deep-rooted determinants of long-run 
development. 
 
In this paper we link the literature on the fundamental drivers of economic development 
with that on the impacts of climate change and show what the evidence suggests about the 
potential effects of climate change on long-run economic growth. There is, of course, more 
to economic development than just economic growth. Reducing inequalities and 
empowering marginalised groups, for instance, are also important and integral elements of 
economic development that do not necessarily go hand in hand with economic growth. 
For low-income countries, however, achieving sustained economic growth is essential to 
reduce poverty and increase aggregate living standards as well as to have the necessary 
resources to accomplish other development-related goals.4 We do not review the direct 
effects of climate change on poverty here (see for example Olsson et al. 2014 and 
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Hallegatte et al. 2016), except to note that the uneven distribution of climate impacts – 
with certain locations and groups of people likely to be hit hardest – could have important 
effects on the fundamental drivers of development. Instead our focus is on the long-run 
effects of changing climatic conditions on economic development. 
 
We consider potential mechanisms from climate change to long-run economic 
development that have been relatively neglected to date, including, for instance, effects on 
the distribution of income and political power. Our review concentrates on the empirical 
economics literature that attempts to measure climate impacts. However, we also briefly 
revisit the literature on institutions, on economic growth, and on fragile states, in order to 
highlight the possible mechanisms linking climate impacts to long-run economic 
development. Our review suggests that there are a potentially important set of dynamic 
interactions and feedback loops between institutions, climate (impacts and vulnerability) 
and development, which to date have been understudied. We pay special attention to the 
effects in low-income countries. These countries are anticipated to suffer 
disproportionately the most negative effects of climate change. They also tend to have 
relatively weak economic and political institutions, constraining their ability to cope with 
climate variability and shocks.  
 
Climate change can affect the processes of economic development directly, by modifying 
relevant environmental conditions, with impacts for example on agriculture and labour 
productivity, disease environments, and via the effects of extreme weather events on capital 
formation. These mechanisms are now well established in the literature, albeit the evidence 
base in some cases remains relatively thin given the emerging nature of this research area. 
Aside from direct impacts, climate change might also affect development paths indirectly 
by altering the socio-political environment within which economic growth and 
development take place. We consider two specific channels through which climate change 
might affect development: institutions and conflict. Both of these have profound impacts 
on development outcomes. Each might be affected by climate change for example through 
climate’s effects on poverty, inequality and the distribution of economic or political power, 
on the availability of resources, and on the movement of people. The potential for indirect 
effects from climate change to development is less well established in the literature to date. 
While there is a growing literature on climate and conflict (as reviewed for example in Dell 
et al. 2014), it tends to be mostly a-theoretical, lacking specific causal mechanisms. It is 
therefore difficult to draw policy conclusions from this literature in terms of how 
governments and international organisations can minimise the risk of climate change 
creating conflict. 
 
Regardless of the strength of future mitigation efforts, our climate is already changing in 
response to anthropogenic forcing. Further warming will continue in response to past and 
current emissions, the effects of which on the global climate will be felt for decades to 
come (Solomon et al. 2007). On current trajectories future warming is likely to substantially 
exceed the ‘dangerous’ threshold of two degrees above pre-industrial levels (see e.g. World 
Bank, 2013). We know therefore that some adaptation will be required and that 
development strategies will need to take account of the potential effects of a changing 
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climate.  
 
The literature on the economic impacts of climate change has been reviewed elsewhere, 
most recently in Dell et al. (2014). That review focussed on issues related to identification, 
crucial to establish reliable estimates of impacts. However, while identifying the magnitude 
of aggregate impacts is sufficient to motivate mitigation policies, the design of appropriate 
adaptation and climate-resilient development5  strategies will require information on the 
precise causal mechanisms linking climate and economic outcomes, which is the focus of 
this review. Often, in the least developed countries, the main strategies to cope with 
climate change are developed in parallel to national development strategies or poverty 
reduction strategies (Fankhauser and Schmidt-Traub, 2010). By illustrating potentially 
important mechanisms of effect from climate change to long-run economic development, 
we hope our review might also be useful for informing climate-resilient development 
strategies.  
 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we focus on direct effects of 
climate change, analysing geographical determinants of economic development. In section 
3 we focus on indirect effects. We start by looking at the role of institutions in the process 
of development (section 3.1 and 3.2). We then analyse institutional development, with a 
focus on conflict and political stability, as a relevant mechanism through which the effects 
of climate change can operate (section 3.3). In section 4, we conclude highlighting the main 
lessons from our review, policy implications and research gaps. 
 
 
2.  Geography and development 
 
Geography clearly matters for development. The spatial distribution of economic activity 
(globally and within regions, countries, etc.) is far from random. Instead, human 
settlements and economic activity tend to cluster in particular locations. Some of the 
earliest towns and cities emerged on flood plains, benefitting from the available fertile soils 
and favourable climate. Roman and Medieval settlements tended to be based at militarily 
strategic sites (Michaels and Rauch, 2013). Modern-day economic activity is heavily 
concentrated on coasts and near (ocean-navigable) rivers, to avail of the gains from trade 
(Gallup et al., 1999, 2001).   
 
The observed relationship between geography and development derives at least partly from 
differences relating to the fundamental characteristics of locations. For example, high 
transport costs, due to remoteness from markets, difficult mountainous terrains, or the fact 
of being land-locked, can significantly reduce the growth potential of countries by reducing 
trade opportunities (Gallup et al., 1999), investment and technology absorption 
(Henderson et al., 2001). Many of these factors are fixed (i.e. unchanging over time) and 
therefore will be unaffected by climate change. However, climate change is likely to result 
in changing risk profiles. This might have particularly important implications for economic 
development given the concentration of economic activity in specific locations, particularly 
on coasts, creating the potential for climate change to have costly impacts.  
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Geographical differences between locations, even if small, can lead to amplifying 
differences in the patterns of economic development. According to Galor (2005), 
variations in economic performance across locations today reflect initial differences in 
geographical factors and historical accidents manifested in variation in institutional, social, 
cultural, and political factors. According to New Economic Geography Models, spatial 
differences in economic development, whether between countries, between regions within 
countries, or between rural and urban locations, can be explained not just by natural 
geographical factors (inherent conditions of locations as discussed before) but also by the 
process of circular causation reinforcing agglomeration and development in initially 
favoured locations (Krugman, 1991, 1999; Puga and Venables, 1999; Henderson et al., 
2001). Geographical factors give some places a head-start that magnifies over time and 
which helps us explain the vast spatial differences we see today. Hence, aspects of natural 
geography matter a lot, not because natural features of the landscape lead deterministically 
to the patterns of spatial development that we observe, but because they inspire self-
reinforcing agglomerations (Krugman, 1999). This implies that small differences in terms 
of geographical characteristics can have long-lasting consequences and create natural 
patterns of divergence between different locations that are difficult to reverse.  
 
On the one hand, it seems then that climate should matter a lot given the importance of 
differences in inherent productivity of locations and the possibility of these being 
reinforced by agglomeration effects. On the other hand, those same agglomeration effects 
might mean that future climate changes are unlikely to alter the relative spatial distribution 
of development. However this has important implications for adaptation (and development 
planning generally). The historical lock-in of spatial development patterns might create 
excessive exposure to natural hazards. This effect relates to the switching costs that 
societies would face if they were to change their historical spatial development, with the 
result that such patterns tend to persist even after substantial and damaging shocks such as 
war-time bombing (Davis and Weinstein, 2002) and large scale floods (Kocornik-Mina et 
al. 2015). For example, the fact that the earliest towns and cities emerged on flood plains 
obviously leaves them vulnerable to flooding risk. In the past, that risk may have been 
worthwhile to avail of the economic benefits inherent to those locations (in this case soil 
fertility). However, such location benefits may no longer be economically relevant, creating 
an excessive or unwarranted exposure to flooding risk. The difficulty of reversing patterns 
of spatial development therefore reinforces the need to consider future climate risk for 
development planning. Moreover, as those particular geographical characteristics more 
suitable for economic development are likely to change over time (for instance as 
transportation and communication technologies evolve or as economic structure changes) 
it also implies that sound interventions to foster specific advantages of locations can 
generate magnified benefits. 
 
Urban centres deserve special attention. Cities are the drivers of modern economic growth 
(i.e. Jacobs, 1985; Glaeser, 2011). With a high concentration of assets (both physical and 
human) in urban locations, these areas are particularly important in terms of investment, 
innovation and technological change, all fundamental for economic development. 
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Disruptions to urban economies might therefore be particularly costly, not just in terms of 
the direct losses resulting from the destruction of assets, but also the potential knock-on 
effects for the wider economy and the rate of innovation and productivity growth, which 
ultimately determine an economy’s long-run growth potential. Moreover, in spite of high 
congestion costs associated with increasing concentration in urban centres,6 cities in many 
developing countries today continue to grow rapidly. While in many countries (like China) 
this is the natural by-product of structural change and greater opportunities in cities, in 
other countries (mainly in Sub-Saharan Africa) this happens also due to non-economic 
factors (Bloom et al., 2008), in particular as people are pushed away from rural areas due to 
diminishing resources, violent conflicts and in some cases, following natural disasters. In 
this latter case, there is rapid urbanisation without industrialisation and growth (see for 
instance Fay and Opal 2000; Kim 2008; Gollin et al. 2014). Climate change represents a risk 
in this regard as it creates an additional rural push factor driving people into cities (see e.g. 
Barrios et al., 2006; Henderson et al., 2014), as a result of climatic stress in rural areas. This 
climate-driven rural push factor adds to inefficient growth of urban areas (mega-cities), 
especially in places that are ill-equipped to cope with rapidly growing populations. 
Increasing agglomeration under deficient urban environments has been shown to reduce, 
rather than to increase, economic growth (Castells-Quintana, 2015). In this regard the 
provision of the necessary infrastructure arises not just as fundamental in terms of 
economic growth and development but also in terms of sustainable adaptation.  
 
2.1. Direct effects of climate 
 
Climate change represents a shift in the distribution of future weather, and can therefore 
distort both the mean and the variability of economically relevant weather variables, as well 
as potentially increasing the frequency and intensity of extreme weather events, leading to 
natural disasters (see e.g. IPCC, 2012). These changes are anticipated to exacerbate existing 
environmental challenges in poorer countries that already face hotter and more variable 
weather conditions (Stern, 2007; IPCC, 2013, 2014; World Bank, 2010, 2013), to which 
they struggle to adapt (e.g. Brooks et al., 2005, Barr et al., 2010). 
 
It has often been observed that hotter countries tend also to be poorer (e.g. Gallup et al., 
1999). However, in order to establish a causal effect of temperature (or other climatic 
variable) on income, it is necessary to look at changes over time, in order to isolate the 
effect of climate from other factors, which happen to be correlated with it. Several recent 
papers now explicitly focus on temperature changes over time. Looking at worldwide 
average temperatures and their relationship with economic growth, recent evidence 
suggests that, on average, a 1°C of global temperature increase reduces growth by 0.9 per 
cent (Bansal and Ochoa, 2009). This impact is found to be large for those countries that 
are closer to the Equator and negligible in countries at high latitudes. Looking at country-
level temperature shocks, several papers find similarly negative effects on growth from 
higher temperatures, especially in poor countries (e.g. Dell et al., 2012; Brown et al., 2013). 
Jones and Olken (2010) find that higher temperatures in poor countries lead to large and 
negative impacts on the growth of their exports. Examining the industrial breakdown of 
the impacts of temperature, their findings show negative effects on agricultural exports and 
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light manufacturing exports (but little effect on heavy industry or raw materials 
production). Dell et al. (2012) find an analogous negative impact of higher temperature on 
industrial output. These findings indicate that climate change will have economic 
consequences beyond the agricultural sector. These effects might operate, for example, via 
the effect of temperature on productivity (see Martin et al., 2011; Advaryu et al., 2014), in 
line with arguments emphasising that factory workers are less productive when it is hot.7 
The negative effects of temperature shocks on economic activity seem to be permanent 
rather than transitory, substantially affecting the rate of economic growth and not only the 
level of output, with a 1°C increase in mean temperature in a given year reducing income 
per-capita by 1.4 per cent (Dell et al., 2012). 
 
The effect of temperature is also felt in today´s developed countries; Deryugina and Hsiang 
(2014), using within-county variation in temperatures for the last decades, find significant 
effects of temperature on productivity in the United States – productivity of individual days 
declines roughly 1.7% for each 1°C increase in daily average temperature above 15°C. 
 
Several other papers focus on (changes in) rainfall patterns as a consequence of a changing 
climate (e.g. O’Connell and Ndulu, 2000; Barrios et al., 2010; Brown and Lall, 2006; Brown 
et al., 2013). In the particular case of Africa, a significant decrease in rainfall levels has been 
observed since the 1960s (Nicholson, 2000, 2001). Given the importance of the agricultural 
sector in Africa, and the relevance of rainfall for agricultural productivity, this decline 
might have important consequences for economic growth, as has been suggested by Bloom 
and Sachs (1998) and Collier and Gunning (1999). Indeed, O’Connell and Ndulu (2000) 
found significant lower long-run economic growth rates in Africa in those countries with a 
higher proportion of dry years. Similarly, Barrios et al. (2010), studying the relationship 
between rainfall and economic growth for 22 African and 38 non-African countries over 
the period 1960-1990, provide evidence on the adverse effects on economic growth rates 
of the general decline in rainfall in Africa during recent decades (controlling for effects 
from temperatures, which they find not to be significant). This effect of rainfall was not 
found for other developing countries. According to the results of simulations carried out 
by these authors, if rainfall in Africa had remained at previous levels, the current gap in 
GDP per capita relative to other developing countries could have been between 15 per 
cent and 40 per cent lower. 
 
2.2. Climate change and economic performance: Mechanisms 
 
A caveat in relation to most of the empirical literature mentioned here is that it tests 
‘reduced form’ relationships – i.e. looks directly at the relationship between climate 
variables (e.g. temperature or rainfall shocks) and economic growth or output, without 
formally testing the causal mechanisms connecting climate and the economy. Several 
channels allow for climate change to directly affect economic performance. In what follows 
we discuss some of the most likely mechanisms.  
 
A. Agriculture and labour productivity 
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Parsons (2014) explains how changes in the temperature can reduce labour productivity. 
When heat exposure is high, changes in the air temperature not only affect body 
temperature but also productivity during work time. Physical work activities add surplus 
heat production to the human body, so when the air temperature is higher than 37 C, the 
heat transfer goes into the body but at high temperatures and humidity level, and 
evaporation of sweat in order to reduce the body heat is less effective. In these scenarios, 
sweating continues but there is no body heat loss via evaporation, leading to a decrease in 
physical performance. Hence, deteriorating climatic conditions can reduce not only 
agricultural productivity (Deschenes and Greenstone, 2007; Guiteras, 2009; Schlenker and 
Lobell, 2010; Feng et al., 2010)8 but also labour productivity in industrial sectors that lack 
efficient cooling systems (Martin et al., 2011; Advaryu et al., 2014; Dunne et al 2013, 
Zander et al 2015). And low agricultural productivity, for instance due to poor soil quality, 
lack of fresh water, prevalence of pests, and in general less suitable conditions for the 
spread and improvement of agriculture, not only reduces agricultural output but it can also 
retard industrial development (e.g. Diamond, 1997).  
 
Some works have tried to estimate the magnitude of the effect of changes in temperature 
on labour productivity. Dunne et al (2013) have estimated that during the last few decades, 
heat stress has reduced labour capacity to 90% during peak months, being the tropical and 
mid-latitudes regions the most affected areas. However, the impact of these changes will 
also depend on other factors such as climate sensitivity, future population distributions, 
CO2 emissions and technological change. Zander et al (2015) highlight the importance of 
adopting measures to reduce the heat effect. They estimate the costs of absenteeism and 
work performance due to heat in Australia during 2013/214 and calculate an annual cost of 
US$655 per person and around US$6.2 billions for the Australian workforce (0.33-0.47% 
of Australian GDP).  
 
B. Disease environments and population dynamics 
Second, changing weather patterns might have longer-term development effects by altering 
disease environments, both via changes in environmental conditions and via the effects of 
weather patterns on migration and urbanisation patterns. Particularly harsh disease 
environments, for instance characterised by a high prevalence of malaria (Gallup and 
Sachs, 2001; Sachs and Malaney, 2002), can significantly reduce productivity in several ways 
(see also Masters and McMillan, 2001). A harsh environment affects health (Deschenes and 
Greenstone, 2011) and reduces work capacity and productivity directly (Seppanen et al., 
2006; Sudarshan and Tewari, 2014). Diseases also increase child mortality and lower life 
expectancy, which in turn increases fertility and harms incentives to acquire and accumulate 
human capital, creating regional-specific patterns of demographic transition, leading 
ultimately to slower development of regions with unfavourable environmental conditions 
(Strulik, 2008).  
 
Climatic conditions can also affect population dynamics and migration patterns, in turn 
affecting the pace and form of structural change and urbanisation processes (e.g. Barrios et 
al., 2006; Henderson et al., 2014).9 One risk of the concentration of population in urban 
areas is that urban agglomerations are particularly susceptible to flooding and heat stress, 
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and allow more rapid spreading of diseases such as cholera – especially where basic services 
such as access to water and sanitation facilities are underprovided.  
 
C. Extreme weather events and the depreciation of capital:   
Climate-related shocks, such as extreme weather events, can also depreciate the stock of 
physical, human and environmental capital (Hochrainer, 2009), and damage key 
infrastructures (Heltberg et. al., 2008). Likewise, climate-related shocks also modify saving 
and investment decisions, not just of domestic agents (Hallegate, 2014) but also of 
potential foreign investors (Escaleras and Register, 2011), affecting both physical as well as 
human capital accumulation.10 
 
Looking at the empirical evidence, several papers confirm that natural disasters represent 
setbacks for economic growth (e.g. Hsiang, 2010; Hsiang and Narita, 2012; Hsiang and 
Jina, 2014; McDermott et al., 2014). Although it had previously been suggested that 
disasters could have a positive impact on economic growth (Skidmore and Toya, 2002), 
recent literature shows that such positive effects would only occur in response to relatively 
moderate disasters (Loayza et al., 2012). Positive effects might be associated with 
reconstruction and the opportunity to renew and upgrade installed capital, infrastructure 
and existence technologies. However, severe disasters, especially those that affect poor 
countries, are significantly associated with lower economic growth (Raddatz, 2009; Loayza 
et al., 2012). According to Loayza et al. (2012) different disasters have differentiated effects 
on growth depending on the economic sector; droughts and storms are found to have the 
strongest negative effects for agricultural productivity. Given that the elasticity of poverty 
to growth generated in the agricultural sector is higher than for other sectors of the 
economy, these disasters can be expected to affect the poor disproportionately. 
 
 
3.  Indirect mechanisms: Climate change and institutional development 
 
There are at least two main reasons to focus on institutional development in the analysis of 
the effects of climate change. First, the evidence reviewed so far appears to indicate that 
geography (including locational fundamentals and climate) matters a lot for economic 
development, particularly in its early stages, but perhaps less so as modern economic 
growth ‘takes off’. This is also reflected in the empirical evidence on the impacts of climate 
shocks and disasters, which appear to have important macroeconomic (and growth) 
impacts in poorer countries, whereas similar events tend not to disrupt the economies of 
relatively wealthy developed nations. There is thus, perhaps, some threshold of 
development - in terms of income or institutional quality - below which climate will 
continue to exert a significant direct influence on economic development.11 In particular, 
many low-income countries, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, but also some middle-
income countries, have states that are unable to perform minimum functions expected 
from modern sovereign states. These states are defined as “weak”, “fragile” or even 
“failed” or “collapsed” (Zartman, 1995; Torres and Anderson, 2004).12 The combination of 
weak institutions and a lack of basic economic, financial and physical infrastructure, result 
in the difficulty faced by many of these poor countries in escaping from poverty (see e.g. 
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Collier et al., 2008; Dercon, 2012), but also in their relatively low adaptive capacity (see e.g. 
Fankhauser and McDermott, 2014) and their subsequent economic vulnerability to climate 
shocks.  
 
Second, there is increasing evidence that beyond direct effects, climate (and geography in 
general) can also affect the possibilities for development by affecting the socio-political and 
institutional environment in which development takes place. Climate might have an effect 
on state fragility itself, for example as a catalyst of conflict or as a factor increasing the 
extent and intensity of existing conflicts. There is increasing evidence on how geographical 
factors influence institutional development (Engerman and Sokoloff, 1997; Acemoglu et 
al., 2001, 2002; Rodrik, 2004; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012) and the likelihood of conflict 
(Miguel et al., 2004; Hsiang et al., 2011; Dell et al., 2014).  
 
In this section we analyse the role of geography in the socio-political and institutional 
environment to better understand potential indirect effects of climate change in the process 
of economic development and economic growth. We focus on institutional capacities and 
the potential for climate to alter the conditions under which institutions evolve, including 
the effects of climate on conflict.  
 
3.1. Geography, institutions and development 
 
Institutions clearly matter greatly for economic development. The relevance of institutions 
in the prosperity of nations has been highlighted since the beginnings of modern economic 
thought - from Smith (1776) to Veblen (1899), Commons (1924), Galbraith (1958), Myrdal 
(1968) and many others.13 Since then our knowledge of how institutions shape and interact 
with economic development has substantially increased. But our understanding of how 
institutional arrangements evolve over time and what factors contribute to successful 
institutional reform in different contexts remains somewhat limited. It appears that 
geography, broadly defined to include climate, physical geography and resource 
endowments, may have played an important role in the emergence of modern institutions 
and the apparently crucial distinction between locations that evolved extractive versus 
inclusive institutions. Acemoglu et al. (2001) famously used variation in disease 
environments to explain the emergence of extractive institutions in some locations (e.g. 
Africa) and inclusive institutions in others (e.g. North America). It does not automatically 
follow, however, that climate change should have any great influence on the future 
development of economic and political institutions. Certainly it seems unlikely, barring 
catastrophic scenarios, that climate change will have any major bearing on institutional 
arrangements in places with established stable and inclusive regimes.14 On the other hand, 
in locations where power, institutions, and the rule of law are more contested – i.e. in 
fragile states – subtle changes to political incentives resulting from changes in 
environmental conditions, changes in the value of natural assets, or disputes over resources 
could generate non-negligible effects on institutional quality.  
 
Other potential mechanisms from climate (change) to institutional change, discussed in 
more detail below, include; the reinforcement of existing social and economic inequalities 
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due to the unequal distribution of anticipated impacts from climate change; disruptions to 
long-run investments, including the provision of public goods and services, and human 
capital investments following weather shocks that reduce output or destroy assets; and 
disruptions to political stability, in the form of the (at times violent) contesting of power 
following income shocks. For less developed regions generally, their greater vulnerability to 
climate change and relatively weak existing institutions could make the threat of climate 
change more relevant for institutional development. Understanding the emergence of 
institutions is therefore crucial for understanding the potential role of climate (change) for 
long-term economic development. 
 
In spite of their crucial importance in defining the possibilities for economic development, 
institutions remain poorly understood. One difficulty is that institutional development is 
highly endogenous to the evolution of economic life; institutions shape economic 
development as much as the evolution of economic life shapes the evolution of 
institutions. A number of studies have attempted to identify causal links from institutional 
quality (usually looking at measures reflecting the quality of economic institutions) to 
economic performance and long-run prosperity (Mauro, 1995; Engerman and Sokoloff, 
1997, 2000; Hall and Jones, 1999; Acemoglu et al., 2001, 2002; Rodrik et al., 2004).15 But 
country-wide proxies for institutional quality are far from perfect, and cross-country 
econometric analysis of the role of institutions on economic development based on these 
proxies has several limitations and can even be misleading.16 Likewise, despite the clear 
association between institutional development and economic development, advocating for 
single-recipe institutional reforms as a straightforward way of achieving economic 
development is simplistic and potentially risky (Bates (2006), for example, links political 
reform to increased likelihood of conflict and violence in Africa).  
 
For poor countries the assessment of institutional quality becomes difficult and policy 
prescription becomes overwhelming, as most indicators of institutional quality are hardly 
met. In this context several authors have suggested that countries should focus on 
achieving “good enough governance” and “second-best institutions”, looking at specific 
reforms that are essential, feasible, easier to implement, and that take into account the stage 
of development as well as interactions with initial conditions and context-specific 
institutional arrangements already in place (Grindle, 2004; Rodrik, 2008). In particular, 
fostering economic growth and improved economic opportunities for the majority of the 
population, even under sub-optimal institutional arrangements, has been shown to 
potentially play a fundamental role in fostering institutional change itself (Rodrik, 2008).17 
Societies face a set of “institutional opportunities” which improves as countries emerge 
from poverty and accumulate human, social and physical capital (Djankov et al., 2003; 
Glaeser et al., 2004). Climate change not only has a direct impact on economic growth (as 
shown in section 2), but it also shapes the “institutional opportunities” that each country 
faces. In this context, climate change should be taken into account in the design of key 
reforms to spur growth as well as in the design of new, context-specific institutions.  
 
Instability, conflict and economic development 
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Instability and persistent (violent) conflict are two of the most worrying and common 
elements characterising fragile states (Rotberg, 2003), deterring their opportunities for 
prosperity: conflict and political instability have been found to significantly hamper growth 
and economic development (Gupta, 1990; Barro, 1991; Knack and Keefer, 1995; Alesina 
and Perotti, 1996; Easterly and Levine, 1997; Rodrik, 1999; Sala-i-Martin et al., 2004; 
Butkiewicz and Yanikkaya, 2005). 18  Furthermore, instability and conflict have been 
identified as a powerful trap for poverty and underdevelopment, leading to lower economic 
development (Collier, 2007). Underdeveloped countries are in turn more prone to conflict 
and instability. Indeed, countries in conflict are among the worst Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs) performers, frequently regressing on key indicators, with the direct impacts 
of warfare usually accompanied by a weakened economy and government capacity, leading 
to lower development prospects, in some cases pushing countries into a downward spiral 
(UNDP, 2011). However, theories about state formation and failure consider conflict as an 
integral element of countries’ institutional development (see Di John, 2010). Institutions 
are defined by conflict of interests and the distribution of power within societies. Climate 
change can alter the economic opportunities of different groups and trigger conflict over 
natural resources and the distribution of power, therefore likely playing a role in the 
definition of institutions. It then becomes essential to better understand how climate 
change affects different groups, and the mechanisms linking these effects to conflict 
propensity and intensity and institutional development. 
 
3.2. The (potential) role of climate change 
 
The possibility of strong and long-lasting effects of climate change and climate-related 
shocks in the process of development has been analysed in historical perspective (Davis, 
2002; Fagan, 2005, 2009).  
 
There is evidence that significant changes in climate (temperature and rainfall patterns) 
already had important societal impacts in the distant past. For instance, Dixit et al. (2014) 
report a connection between weakening of the Indian summer monsoon and de-
urbanisation in India around 4,100 years ago, in a time of severe aridification, which 
affected several Early Bronze Age populations. Similarly, Pederson et al. (2014) suggest that 
unusual above-average moisture in central Mongolia promoted high grassland productivity 
and favoured the formation of Mongol political and military power that facilitated the 
emergence of the vast 13th century Mongol Empire. Although the changes in temperature 
and rainfall patterns analysed in these papers occurred before human-induced climate 
change, the evidence about their impacts reinforces the relevance of changing climatic 
patterns today.19 
 
Looking at modern times, there appears to be some correlation between weather 
conditions and conflict globally. For instance, drylands are among the most conflict-prone 
regions of the world. In 2007, 80 percent of major armed conflicts worldwide occurred in 
drylands (UNDP, 2011). Although such correlations tell us nothing about causation - as in 
the debate over the relationship between climate and development - there is now a growing 
empirical literature assessing possible climatic determinants of conflict (see Homer-Dixon, 
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1991; Dell et al., 2014). It has even been argued that changing climatic conditions can lead 
to the collapse of societies, as a result of increased conflict associated with environmental 
stress (Diamond, 2005).  
 
Looking at global patterns, Hsiang et al. (2011) have demonstrated that civil conflicts are 
indeed associated with climatic variation, based on observations of a relationship between 
El Niño/Southern Oscillation (ENSO) fluctuations and annual conflict risk. A number of 
papers link periods of drought with increased conflict (e.g. Couttenier and Soubeyran, 
2013; Maystadt and Ecker, 2014; and Maystadt et al., 2013). Similarly, Burke et al. (2009) 
find that hotter years are associated with increased incidence of civil war in Africa in the 
late 20th century. Hendrix and Salehyan (2012) conclude that rainfall deviations in either 
direction may be related to conflict, but that violent events are more responsive to heavy 
rainfall (which may cause subsequent scarcity through the effect of flooding on agricultural 
yields). 
 
Climate change is likely to modify the environmental context and the opportunities 
available to individuals and societies, potentially reinforcing material inequalities as well as 
influencing the distribution of power within societies. In this way, climate change can 
influence not only the probability and intensity of conflict but also institutional 
arrangements and therefore institutional development. However, empirical evidence in this 
regard remains limited, with few papers explicitly studying the relationship between climate 
change and political change. This appears to be a significant research gap. 
 
A. Poverty and income shocks 
Burke and Leigh (2010) and Bruckner and Ciccone (2011) are among the first to test 
empirically the relationship between climate and institutional change. Although these works 
use changes in climatic conditions as an exogenous shock to output, their conclusions seem 
to support the idea that weather shocks may lead to institutional change; in this case 
democratisation. In both papers, the mechanism proposed is via output: negative rainfall 
shocks open a ‘window of opportunity’ for democratic improvement because it translates 
into a transitory negative GDP shock and a lower opportunity cost of contesting power. In 
contrast to these findings, Dell et al. (2012), highlighting a similar mechanism, show that 
adverse temperature shocks might increase the probability of irregular leader transitions 
such as coups, resulting in negative impacts on economic growth. They support their 
results on the previous empirical evidence that riots and protests are more likely in warmer 
weather (Boyanowsky, 1999) and, in addition, on the idea that economic impacts of higher 
temperatures might provoke dissatisfied citizens to seek institutional change – in this case 
with negative results for the economy. 
 
These somewhat contrasting results illustrate the need for a greater understanding of the 
mechanisms that potentially link climatic conditions to institutional change. The authors 
cited above emphasise the effects of weather shocks on income, leading to changes in the 
opportunity cost of contesting power. However, such a mechanism potentially represents a 
double-edged sword for institutional development; on the one hand, the opportunity to 
contest power offers a possible ‘window of opportunity’ for institutional improvement (e.g. 
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through removal of an autocratic regime). On the other hand, contesting power might 
involve (violent) conflict, with no guarantee of an improved outcome.   
 
The role of income shocks is also prominent in the literature on climate and conflict. For 
example, contest models of conflict (e.g. Hirshleifer, 1988, 1989; Garfinkel, 1990; 
Skaperdas, 1992) highlight the association between poverty and conflict through 
individuals’ incentives to maintain order, and therefore predict higher likelihood of conflict 
in poorer countries or regions.20 This mechanism underlies many of the empirical studies of 
climate and conflict to date (see Dell et al., 2014, for a review of this empirical literature). 
Miguel et al. (2004) were among the first to propose and test the relationship between 
weather shocks and conflict, finding that negative economic shocks, caused by decreases in 
the level of rainfall, tend to trigger conflict. Since then, this strand of literature has 
expanded rapidly, with numerous papers finding significant links between weather variation 
and conflict. However, these findings have not been uncontroversial, and there remains 
some uncertainty over the precise causal mechanisms linking climate and conflict and the 
most relevant climatic variables.  
 
In a review of the arguments for climate variability to influence conflict though economic 
growth, Koubi et al. (2012) find no evidence of significant effects of climate variability on 
growth. Miguel and Satyanath (2011) similarly argue that for the period 2000-2009 there is 
no strong relationship between rainfall and growth for African countries, implying that 
rainfall might not be used as an instrument to study the effect of economic shocks on 
conflict risk. Sarsons (2011) has also found problems using rainfall as a measure of 
economic shocks. Whereas he supports previous findings in rain-fed districts in India 
(Bohlken and Sergenti 2010), he argues that in dam-fed districts wages are less sensitive to 
rain shocks (although he finds that rainfall might still affect conflict through a channel 
other than income in these districts). Dell et al. (2014) propose different reasons for the 
diverse findings in the literature: omitted fixed effects, differences in the way both weather 
and conflict are parameterised, and noisy estimates make it difficult to reach conclusions 
about the effect of rainfall fluctuation on conflict risk. 
 
According to Chassang and Padro-i-Miquel (2008, 2009) the likelihood of conflict increases 
after negative shocks while it decreases with the expectations of higher incomes. Hence, 
lower and volatile growth can lead to higher risk of conflict. As climate-induced income 
shocks hit the poor in a disproportionate way - as discussed elsewhere in this paper - 
climate change might affect the likelihood (and severity) of conflict by reinforcing existing 
poverty dynamics.   
 
For poor countries, climate-induced income shocks have been analysed mostly looking at 
dynamics in rural areas. Variations in agricultural production and cattle herding are among 
the most common mechanisms proposed to explain how temperature and rainfall 
fluctuations might affect conflict risk through income shocks (Miguel et al., 2004; Mehlum 
et al., 2006; Chaney, 2010; and Ciccone, 2011, for rainfall, and Burke et al., 2009, for 
temperature). Negative economic shocks driven by the decrease of rainfall levels have been 
found to increase Muslim-Hindu riots in Indian states (Bohlken and Sergenti, 2010) as well 
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as communal conflict in subnational African regions (Fjelde and von Uexkull, 2012). Using 
data from East Africa, Raleigh and Kniveton (2012) argue that civil war is more likely in 
extreme dry conditions whereas wet conditions are more associated with non-state conflict. 
In a study for Somalia, Maystadt and Ecker (2014) suggest that local livestock markets are 
the primary channels through which droughts fuel conflict, and that livestock price 
downturns and losses in herder’s income lower resistance to engage in conflict and 
decrease the opportunity costs of conflict participation.21  
 
A low opportunity cost of fighting, usually associated with low levels of income per capita, 
has often been identified as one of the main determinants of the probability of conflict 
(Collier and Hoeffler, 1998, 2004; Miguel et al., 2004; Besley and Persson, 2008; Collier et 
al., 2009).22 
 
Negative economic shocks, associated with rainfall, can have long-term effects through 
mass rebellions. Kung and Ma (2014) suggest that suboptimal rainfall may have triggered 
peasant rebellions in China (although these shocks might have been overcome by the 
appearance of Confucianism). In this line Jia (2013) reports that droughts indeed increased 
the probability of peasant revolts in China by 0.7 per cent.  
 
In a similar argument, and looking at long-term trends, Zhang et al. (2007) show how 
fluctuations of war frequency and population change in the pre-industrial era followed the 
cycle of temperature change; long-term climate change directly affects land-carrying 
capacity (agricultural production) and can lead to unrest, conflict, famines and epidemics. 
Waldinger (2013) also finds a significant relationship between climatic trends and peasant 
revolt during the French Revolution – with higher summer temperatures and lower winter 
temperatures associated with increased incidence of revolt. Tol and Wagner (2010) similarly 
find that colder times were associated with increased conflict in Europe. In a European 
context (i.e. in a relatively cold climate), periods of colder weather may have resulted in 
worse growing conditions, and a resultant negative shock to incomes.23  
 
However, income shocks are not the only mechanism that potentially links climate change 
to institutional change and/or conflict. In the rest of this section, we discuss other 
potential mechanisms, relying mainly on theoretical arguments, given the lack of empirical 
work (or very scarce evidence) in this area to date. 
 
B. Inequalities and the distribution of power 
The distribution of power also matters for the quality of institutions and governance as 
well as for conflict. The literature reviewed previously on institutions highlighted the 
relevance of inequalities and the distribution of power. 24  In this literature inequalities 
appear as critical in the development and persistence of institutions as in any scope for 
institutional change; when extreme, inequality can become an important obstacle for 
successful institutional reform, but it is also true that inequality might have been one 
relevant factor behind political revolution, for instance in the extension of the franchise in 
the 19th century in several European countries (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2000; Przeworski, 
2009; Aidt and Franck, 2015). The literature on conflict has also highlighted the role of 
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distribution; Acemoglu and Robinson (2001, 2010) model elites as competing with the 
poor for control of the state and bargaining to accommodate the rest of the society by 
extending the voting franchise in periods when there are real threats of revolt. Ray (2009) 
models the emergence of conflict based on the impossibility to arrange transfers that satisfy 
all groups. His model predicts a high likelihood of conflict in divided societies - either by 
class, geography, religion, or ethnicity. Ethnic polarisation (rather than fractionalisation) 
has also been highlighted as a significant determinant of conflict; in societies where a large 
ethnic minority faces an ethnic majority severe conflict is more likely to arise (Montalvo 
and Reynal-Querol, 2005).25 Thus, where climate change is expected to reinforce existing 
inequalities, this could have knock-on effects for the quality of institutions and ultimately 
conflict.  
 
 
 
C. Resources, incentives and information 
It has been suggested that geography (including climate) matters in the choice of economic 
policy itself (Gallup et al., 1999). The logic is that the political economy of policy formation 
depends on the incentives faced by policy-makers. Where growth prospects are weak, the 
incentive to pursue pro-growth, inclusive economic policies may be weaker than the 
incentive to pursue ‘extractive’ type policies that produce short-term benefits for those in 
power. Alternatively, the decline of aggregate output can diminish government revenues, 
making the state invest less in state capacity and security. In any case, climatic conditions, 
by modifying the growth prospects of poorer nations, might also lead to endogenously 
worse economic policies.   
 
This reasoning is similar in spirit to some of the resource curse literature, where natural 
resources have been identified as playing a role in conflict risk (e.g. Fearon and Laitin, 
2003). Natural resource revenues represent a bigger (and more easily appropriable) prize in 
case of success and also a source of finance for fighting activities. Besley and Persson 
(2008) also highlight the role of the nature of the prize and how it will be distributed given 
institutional constraints, the technology for fighting and the likely allocation of power in 
the absence of an insurgency. As a consequence, not only does conflict diminish state 
capacity, but it is only when political institutions provide insufficient checks and balances 
or enough protection for those excluded from power that other determinants of conflict, 
such as climate, aid or external shocks, become significant determinants increasing the 
likelihood of conflict (Besley and Persson, 2009). 
Sachs and Warner (2001) show how natural resource countries tend to miss-out on export-
led growth. Natural resources can also make the government less accountable to the 
population (as relying on natural resource extraction rather than on taxation). This suggests 
a further political-economy risk associated with climate change; i.e. that climate finance 
flows to developing countries could make their governments less politically accountable.   
Another related set of conflict models looks at the problem of commitment (Walter, 1997; 
Garfinkel and Skaperdas, 2000; Powell, 2006; McBride and Skaperdas, 2007). According to 
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these models civil war is more likely to occur when there are limits to conflict resolution 
and contract enforcement along with a high probability of a shifting distribution of power. 
The distributional effects of climate change might therefore play a role in contributing to 
the risk of civil conflicts.  
Economic inequalities (Fearon, 2007) and frustration (Davies, 1962; Gurr, 1971; Paige, 
1975; Scott, 1976; Petersen, 2001; looking at agrarian revolutions in the 1960s and 1970s) 
clearly play a strong motivating role in many conflicts. However, nonmaterial incentives, 
including grievances and vengeance, might better describe proximate explanations of 
conflict (Roemer, 1985; Wood, 2003). Climate change might also play a role here when 
grievances over resources (e.g. water, access to land, grazing rights etc.) are generated by 
changing environmental conditions. 
Finally, recent literature distinguishes between motivation of conflict and feasibility of 
conflict. On the one hand, motivation can be driven by root causes, whether historical, 
political or socio-economic, with poverty, inequality and political exclusion being 
commonly discussed in this regard. Feasibility, on the other hand, may be driven by 
circumstances distinct to motivation, and has been the focus of several authors (Hirshleifer, 
2001; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Weinstein, 2005; Collier et al., 2009). According to these 
authors, conflict will be more likely to occur where it is financially and militarily feasible, 
and this in turn is likely to depend on a combination of geographic and demographic 
factors, as well as on the presence of an ineffective state.  
D. Migration and human capital 
One important way in which climate shocks can increase the likelihood of conflict is by 
inducing migration. In fact, one of the main security challenges brought about by climate 
change (through increasing the frequency and severity of climate-related natural disasters as 
well as through affecting natural resources and weather conditions) is the rise in mass 
migrations. Mass waves of ‘climate refugees’ are regularly cited as one of the potential risks 
of runaway (unabated) climate change. For example, Myers and Kent (1995) forecast 150 
million environmentally-induced refugees by 2050 (although according to Gemenne (2011) 
these estimates appear to lack empirical support). While the numbers may be speculative, 
the risks are not so easily dismissed. It is notable that the security/military community takes 
these threats seriously, and conducts its risk assessments on the basis of considering 
multiple plausible future scenarios. For instance, according to the Campbell et al. (2007) 
report, the disappearance of low lying coastal lands could conceivably lead to massive 
migrations - potentially involving hundreds of millions of people - and trigger major 
security concerns and spike regional tensions.26  
 
Regardless of its impacts on the number of future migrants, climate change also has the 
potential to alter the quality of migration patterns (Jäger et al., 2009). While the 
displacement of people following natural disasters is typically temporary, over short 
distances and along well established routes (McMichael et al., 2012), climate change has the 
potential to generate extreme events, or combinations of events, that would overwhelm 
existing coping mechanisms, leading to larger-scale, longer-term and longer-distance 
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migrations that are likely to be less organised or planned. These irregular and/or 
unexpected migrations pose the greatest threat to stability and security (Foresight, 2011).  
Hidalgo et al. (2010) examine the link between weather conditions and conflict looking at 
land invasions. Exploring municipal-level data from 1988 to 2004 in Brazil and using 
rainfall variation as a proxy of adverse economic shocks, they find that these shocks cause 
the rural poor to invade large landholdings. Nevertheless, their findings exhibit 
considerable heterogeneity by land inequality and land tenure systems. In highly unequal 
municipalities, negative income shocks (measured as climate shocks) cause twice as many 
land invasions as in municipalities with average land inequality.  
 
In section 2.2 we saw potential direct effects of climate change on the disease environment. 
Another potential risk is the threat to human health posed by large-scale population 
movements: “[T]he health risks posed by climate-related population movements are likely 
to become a major s urce of human suffering, disability, and loss of life—an outcome that, 
currently, appears more likely than the much-debated possibility of increased violent 
conflict or state failure (Kolmannskog, 2008).” – McMichael et al. (2012, pp.646-7). But 
these are not distinct (separate) threats. On the contrary, migration, disease patterns and 
violent conflict interact in complicated ways, and potentially reinforce each other. In the 
context of agriculturally-marginal semi-arid zones of West-Central Africa, Miller (1982) 
documents historical links between climate change and patterns of settlement and 
migration, with an emphasis on the effects of climate induced scarcity on migration, 
disease, and migration-induced conflict.  
 
Finally, and as mentioned before, the opportunities for institutional development depend 
on levels of human capital (Djankov et al., 2003; Glaeser et al., 2004). Thus, another 
mechanism through which climate change can deter institutional development is, of course, 
by hindering human capital accumulation. 
 
E. Extreme weather events 
Few papers explicitly focus on the link between natural disasters and conflict. Although this 
literature is not extensive, some writings on environmental security and “political ecology” 
provide useful arguments for understanding how natural disasters might impact societies 
and how these events might affect conflict risk through their impacts on social variables, 
such as migration, as well as on economic variables. Nel and Righarts (2008) use data for 
187 political units for the period 1950-2000 to explore this question and find that natural 
disasters significantly increase the risk of violent civil conflict both in the short and 
medium-term, particularly in low- and middle-income countries that have high levels of 
inequality, mixed political regimes, and sluggish economic growth. However, these 
conclusions appear to be contradicted by Slettebak (2012) who finds that countries that are 
affected by natural disasters have a lower risk of civil war. Different explanations are given: 
one explanation comes from the sociology of crisis and is related to the idea that people tend 
to unite in adversity. Another explanation suggests that disasters provide an opportunity 
for governments to display both their competence and incompetence, so the negative 
effect of disasters on conflict can be read as a way used by the government to improve 
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their popularity, reducing the pool of potential recruits for insurgent organisations. Among 
this group of literature, Bergholt and Lujala (2012) find that natural disasters have a 
negative effect on economic growth, but this does not translate into an increased risk of 
conflict.  
 
 
4.  Conclusion and policy implications  
 
In this paper we have studied the role of climate change in the process of long-term 
economic growth and development, reviewing the literature on the determinants of 
economic development and analysing the role that climate change can potentially have in 
this regard. We have looked at both potential direct and indirect effects of climate change, 
focusing on implications for low-income countries. This broad approach allows us to 
better understand in an integrated way the different effects of climate change on long-term 
development and frame the adaptation discussion in terms of climate-resilient economic 
development, as well as identifying policy implications. In particular we have analysed the 
role of geography and institutions, with a focus on conflict and instability, in the process of 
development. In each case we have looked at possible effects of climate change and 
climate-related shocks, as well as at the empirical evidence on these effects and existing 
gaps in the literature.  
 
Looking at the direct effect of climate, we have described how climate change can affect 
the processes of long-run economic growth and development in different ways. 
Additionally, we have analysed how, given unequal anticipated effects across rich and poor 
countries, climate change can potentially reinforce both spatial inequalities and poverty trap 
dynamics. We have also described the potentially important effects of climate change on 
economic development through its indirect effects on the socio-political and institutional 
environment. First, climate change can alter the context within which institutional 
development takes place. Second, given its significant role in the likelihood and intensity of 
conflict, changing climatic conditions can also affect the socio-political stability of 
countries. 
 
The evidence reviewed confirms distinct effects of climate shocks across rich and poor 
countries; the macro impacts of a changing climate will be felt more strongly in poorer, and 
especially in fragile, states. At the same time, it is in these same countries where the indirect 
effects of climate change become most relevant, potentially reinforcing institutional fragility 
and in turn vulnerability to climate shocks. Our analysis also highlights the need to take 
account of the interaction of climate change (risk) with other development trends (e.g. in 
the case of rapid urbanisation, increasing exposure to urban disasters, etc.) for the design of 
sound adaptation strategies and development plans. 
 
Two main policy implications arise from our review. First, it has become evident how 
adaptation strategies to climate change are fundamental not just on their own right, but 
also as key elements of broader poverty-reduction and development strategies. Moreover, 
as climate shocks disproportionally affect the poor, addressing climate-related risks is also a 
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sound strategy in terms of inequality and poverty reduction. Second, given their 
interactions, both geographical and institutional factors need to be considered in the design 
and successful implementation of strategies for both poverty reduction and economic 
development. Not only do geographical factors affect institutional dynamics, but the 
institutional framework is also likely to condition the way geographical factors influence the 
evolution of poverty and economic development. Especially close attention is warranted 
for institutional development in geographically challenged countries (such as those with 
extreme and variable whether conditions, climate-associated epidemic diseases, etc.) where 
these interactions are expected to be strongest. 
 
Finally, from our analysis many relevant questions for further research can be identified. 
Regarding direct effects of climate change on economic development, the main 
outstanding questions relate to identifying the precise causal mechanisms through which 
climate shocks impact on the economy. The policy implications of the current literature are 
mainly on the mitigation side – identifying negative economic impacts of climate 
vulnerability and shocks motivates efforts to minimise future climate change. However, in 
order to make policy-relevant conclusions for adaptation strategies future work should aim 
at better understanding of mechanisms and a move beyond reduced form estimation. 
Significant research gaps also remain regarding the potential indirect effects of climate 
change for economic development, via effects on the overall socio-political environment.  
 
Our review suggests that there are a potentially important set of dynamic interactions and 
feedback loops between institutions, climate (impacts and vulnerability) and development, 
which to date have been understudied. However, we first need to improve our 
understanding of socio-political dynamics, where our knowledge still remains limited. In 
what refers to institutions, there is still a lot to learn about institutional change as well as its 
role in economic development (causal effects, context-specific institutional characteristics, 
feasibility of optimal institutions, etc.). Understanding the role of specific institutions in 
given contexts, and how institutions evolve and adapt in the face of major challenges, 
becomes even more relevant to understand the effects of major shocks such as those 
brought about by climate change.  
 
Most empirical evidence on socio-institutional effects of a changing climate relates to 
(violent) conflict, but there are also potentially important mechanisms via other socio-
cultural factors, institutional elements (including informal institutions, such as contract 
enforcement, trust and cooperation), political economy (incentives), accountability of 
political classes, the potential role of aid flows (including climate finance), many of which 
to date remain under-studied. In this way, it becomes critical, for instance, to understand 
how climate change will affect the political economy of governance (i.e. the domestic 
distribution of political power) and policy formation in challenged countries, or how 
institutional design should take account of climate risks, including concrete 
recommendations for development planning.  
 
In sum, what seems clear from our analysis is that the effects of climate change, whether 
direct or indirect, seem of central relevance for sustainable economic development, 
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especially for poor countries, and in particular for those with fragile states. But our 
understanding of these effects remains limited. The topic clearly deserves further research. 
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Notes:  
 
1 There is a long literature on the proximate determinants of cross-country differences in economic growth 
providing evidence on the role of capital accumulation (see for instance Barro, 1991; Young, 1995; Sala-i-
Martin et al., 2004). Other variables commonly (and robustly) identified to be associated with economic 
growth include innovation and technology, measures of life expectancy, fertility, and economic specialisation, 
as well as geographical and institutional variables. 
2 Attention has variously focused on several potential deep-rooted determinants of development, including 
cultural differences (Ashraf and Galor, 2011), biogeographical factors (Diamond, 1997), geographical factors 
(Gallup et al., 1999, 2001; Easterly and Levine, 2003, among others), institutions (Acemoglu et al., 2001, 2002; 
Rodrik et al., 2004; Besley and Persson, 2011 and Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012), and most recently even 
genetic characteristics (Ashraf and Galor, 2013). 
3 The available evidence suggests that both geographical and institutional factors act as driving forces for 
economic development, with some authors arguing that geography produces most of its impact through its 
effect on institutional development (e.g. Acemoglu et al., 2001; Rodrik, 2004). Even controlling for (national 
level) institutions, however, geographical factors still seem to play a significant and direct role (see for 
example Sachs, 2003; Glaeser et al., 2004). The significant role of geography has also been analysed within 
countries (i.e., Nordhaus 2006, Dell et al. 2009).  
4 A sustained rate of economic growth has the potential to transform economies and lift millions out of 
chronic poverty. Of course, growth does not automatically translate into poverty reduction in the short-run, 
and for all members of society. Empirical estimates of the relationship between growth and poverty vary 
depending on the data used (Ravallion, 1995, Adams, 2004) and the composition and size of economic 
growth (Khan, 2009, Loayza and Raddatz, 2010 and Rose et al, 2013).  
5 Climate-resilient development is defined as ensuring that societies and different groups within them are able 
to cope with climate variability and to adapt to future climate change, trying to preserve development gains 
and to reduce the damages (USAID, 2014). 
6  Agglomeration in large urban centres, for instance, not only raises prices but also increases challenges 
related to transportation, pollution, social cohesion and the provision of adequate public services. 
7 The physiological response of human beings to temperature has been documented from heat studies in the 
lab (e.g. Wyndham, 1969). Such effects might be mitigated by a more widespread adoption of air-
conditioning. As always, the ultimate impacts of climate will depend not just on the level of exposure but also 
on the sensitivity and adaptive capacity of affected regions and societies. 
8 While there might be possible benefits from higher temperatures in some regions due to short-term bio-
productivity increases, negative effects of global warming on agriculture, due not just to higher temperatures 
but also to higher climatic fluctuations, appear to outweigh such benefits (Furuya and Koyama, 2005; Lobell 
and Field, 2007). For developing regions, the anticipated effects of climate change are expected to be 
particularly challenging from a socio-economic perspective (see e.g. Samson et al., 2011).  
9 Barrios et al. (2006) and Henderson et al. (2014) report a significant link between climate and urbanisation 
in Sub-Saharan Africa, which appears especially strong in arid regions. The mechanism is through reduced 
incomes (from agriculture) following periods of reduced moisture availability. 
10 Fankhauser and Tol (2005) have suggested, using model simulations, that the indirect (dynamic) impacts of 
climate change on growth, via lower capital accumulation, could be larger than direct levels effects on output. 
11 Several papers show that growth spurts and collapses are more common than simple ‘convergence’ or 
deterministic growth paths a la neoclassical growth theory (Rodrik 1999; Hausmann et al. 2005; Easterly 
2006). Broadberry et al. (2013) argue that there is some threshold in terms of income and institutional 
development beyond which growth becomes more secure, but below which countries remain vulnerable to 
shocks. 
12 See Di John (2010) for a good review of the literature on “fragile” states.  
13 There are two prominent vies about on the role of institutions. First, based on Smith’s (1776) idea of peace, 
easy taxes, and a tolerable administration of justice, as the requirements for economic development, Besley 
and Persson (2011) focus on the role of fiscal and legal capacity and political stability as the three pillars of 
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prosperity. Second, Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) explain how in the long run countries differ in their 
economic success because of their different institutions, either of extractive or inclusive nature. See Jennings 
(2013) for a more thorough review and comparison of these two approaches.  
14  Except to the extent that mitigation efforts and global climate negotiations might influence domestic 
politics. However, this is a distinct type of effect – likely operating on the political/ideological make-up of 
government, as opposed to affecting the fundamental quality of institutional and governance arrangements.  
15 In all these papers the aim is to identify a causal effect of institutions on economic development, typically 
by using instrumental variables estimations. While Mauro (1995) uses ethnolinguistic fragmentation to 
instrument for corruption, as proxy for institutional quality, the rest of the papers tend to rely on 
geographical variables as instruments for institutional variables. Hall and Jones (1999) rely on distance from 
the Equator, and Acemoglu et al. (2001) on settler mortality rates (in turn determined by disease environment 
given by geographic characteristics and climate). Engerman and Sokoloff (2000) argue that factor 
endowments (mainly in terms of soils, climate, mineral resources and availability of cheap and organised 
labour) determined inequalities in the structures of production and social organisations, which translated into 
persistent institutional arrangements perpetuating over time. 
16  Pande and Udry (2005) explain the limitations of cross-country approaches to analyse the effect of 
institutions on economic development. These limitations mainly relate to the coarseness of institutional 
measures and instruments, omitted variables, and heterogeneous treatment effects, all of which might lead to 
significant upward biases of the effect of institutions on long-run growth. 
17  As noted by several authors, today’s developed countries did not need perfect institutions for 
industrialisation to take place; while some key reforms were essential many other good governance 
characteristics came along with the process of development (Chang, 2001; Grindle, 2004; and Rodrik 2008). 
18 The concept and measure of instability varies across studies. While some authors focus more on violent 
conflict, others consider broader measures of socio-political instability also taking into account social unrest 
and government stability or lack of it. 
19 In a reversal of circumstances, Pederson et al. (2014) report the 21st century drought in central Mongolia as 
being the hottest drought in the last 1,112 years. 
20  Blattman and Miguel (2010) provide a comprehensive review of war’s (economic) causes and 
consequences, identifying several distinct approaches to modeling the origins of conflict. 
21 Weather shocks may increase food prices, typically leading to more frequent uprisings and riots. Depending 
on the circumstances and for specific locations, however, weather shocks might offset current food insecurity 
and help lower the risk of local conflict (Gartzke, 2012). 
22  Indeed, previous evidence supports the idea of decreased output and rural productivity lowering the 
opportunity cost of engaging in conflict and increasing the returns to violence. In a study of the Colombian 
civil conflict, Dube and Vargas (2013) present evidence that steep declines in coffee prices and increases in oil 
prices reduced workers’ wages and increased their propensity to join armed groups. Likewise, Do and Iyer 
(2006) find a strong correlation between civil conflict and poverty and lower levels of human capital, which 
they consider is a proxy for opportunity costs.  
23 Clearly, in hotter climates periods of higher temperatures might be expected to create more difficult growing 
conditions. 
24 See Acemoglu and Robinson (2010, 2012), Besley and Persson (2011), Stiglitz (2012), Krugman (2012), and 
Piketty (2014). In Engerman and Sokoloff (1997, 2000), for instance, the argument rotates around inequality: 
“bad institutions” are the consequence of unequal structures of production and social organisations (as those 
implemented in Latin America after colonisation). Inequalities and bad institutions are in this sense two sides 
of the same coin, reinforcing each other and becoming persistent over time. Higher inequalities are generally 
associated with worse institutions (see Castells-Quintana and Royuela, 2014a), and are in fact considered as a 
relevant handicap for long-run economic growth (Clarke, 1995; Easterly, 2007; Castells-Quintana and 
Royuela, 2014b, among others) 
25 Ethnic favouritism has been identified as a factor also behind inequalities in many African and Asian 
countries, and represents a clear example of the reinforcing feedbacks between political and economic 
inequality, as well as of its negative outcomes (for instance, Fosu et al., 2006, found that the existence of 
ethnically biased interest groups is associated with sub-optimal provision of public goods). But Banerjee et al. 
(2011) bring some optimism showing how information about candidates in India can lead voters towards 
more conscious voting and away from relying solely on ethnicity. Increased audits and electoral accountability 
has led to similar results in Brazil (Ferraz and Finan, 2011). 
26 Other reports highlighting security risks of mass migrations include the National Security and the Threat of 
Climate Change report (CNA Corporation, 2007), the US Department of Defence 2010 Quadrennial Defense 
Review, and the Climate and Social Stress: Implications for Security Analysis (Steinbruner et al., 2013) report. 
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